Observations on Trade Law and Globalization by Dillon, Sara
International Journal of Legal Information
the Official Journal of the International Association of Law Libraries
Volume 33
Issue 1 Spring 2005 Article 8
1-1-2005
Observations on Trade Law and Globalization
Sara Dillon
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli
The International Journal of Legal Information is produced by The International Association of Law
Libraries.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Journal of Legal Information by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dillon, Sara (2005) "Observations on Trade Law and Globalization," International Journal of Legal Information: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli/vol33/iss1/8
  103 
Observations on Trade Law and Globalization 
 
 
 
 
SARA DILLON*  
 
 
 
I imagine most people with an interest in the subject have their own 
working definition of globalization.  My definition goes something like this: 
Globalization is at least in part about the spread of mass markets and common 
tastes, albeit with variations.  International trade law, by reducing the 
possibility that individual countries can “prefer” their own productions, is one 
of the mechanisms for facilitating the spread of these common tastes.1  I am 
by no means implying that the global tastes are elevated ones; in fact, the 
mass-appeal products sought might be inferior in many ways to what came 
before.  The irony of the franchise, for instance, is that better or worse does 
not matter—only sameness.2  The important thing is that the tastes are 
commonly held across a national-culture-free zone, and recognized as such. 
 
Rather than pursuing the more philosophical question of the 
importance of trade and/or globalization, we might consider the importance of 
studying international trade law, and how we should study it, as well as how 
we are studying it now.  I will offer a modest, if stinging critique of how 
international trade law seems to have entered the legal academy as a 
discipline. 
                                                 
*  Sara Dillon has a PhD from Stanford University and a JD from Columbia University 
Law School. She is Associate Professor at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, 
where she teaches International Trade Law, European Union Law, International Law 
and International Chidren's Rights.   
1 At the most basic level, GATT Article I, General Most-Favored Nation Treatment, 
requires participating States to treat the products of all participating trading partners 
without discrimination;  Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation requires these States to treat importing products in the same way they treat 
their own domestic products; and Article XI, General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions, requires that Member States not to set up quantitative barriers to the 
importation of products.  
2 See David Leebron, Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can.. 
Bus.. L.J. 63, 66 (1996). Leebron argues "the term 'harmonization' is something of a 
misnomer insofar as it might be regarded as deriving from the musical notion of 
harmony, for it is difference, not sameness, that makes for musical harmony." Id. at 
67. 
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In this regard, one notices in recent years a proliferation of glossy 
advertising for interdisciplinary studies, in law as in other fields.  But in fact, 
international trade law has contentedly taken its place in the pantheon of 
hermetically sealed subject matter areas.  No idea is so often expressed and so 
strenuously avoided as truly interdisciplinary studies.  Legal training 
particularly encourages a devotion to the decontextualized “dispute.”  
Standing ready to win for one’s side is a respected mode of concern; whereas 
advocating for law reform is generally considered “fluffy” and “non-
rigorous.” 
I am struck by the manner in which international trade law has 
become a regular feature in law school course offerings, and doubt that this 
occurred because of an awakening to its inherent importance to the 
curriculum. 3  Rather, I think that there were clear legal/historical 
developments that made the inclusion of trade law “all right,” acceptable as a 
branch of study, because it came to be seen as sufficiently legal.  Given the 
fact that international trade law is “here,” I would like in the course of this 
article to offer my own prescription for how to revise our pedagogical 
approach to it, by endowing the subject, including its disputes, with meaning 
and significance, rather than mystifying it in the technical sense. 
As a general matter, and with some notable exceptions, there is a 
striking and tragic gulf between humanists or “human rights people,” and 
those engaged in economic law subjects.  As it happens, the courses I teach 
represent several universes of concern: international trade, primarily the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU) Law (with everything from free 
movement of goods through social policy, the environment, and even war and 
peace), as well as the more recent international children’s rights.  I like 
systems critiques.  I like to examine systems—global trade regulation as a 
totality, the EU as an architectural construct, or the United Nations (UN) 
human rights system, such as it is.  For myself, I am certain about whether I 
would prefer to be stranded on a desert island with human rights people on the 
one hand, or economic lawyers on the other.  But be that as it may, in terms of 
the construction of global law, or global governance as some like to put it, this 
split, this divide, between the thinking of trade specialists and humanistic 
lawyers, has become profound, even absurd.  
                                                 
3 A survey of 184 ABA accredited law schools in the United States found that 99 had 
at least one course in International Trade.  Survey results on file with the author.    
2005] SARA DILLON           105 
 
 
  
Since I am the permanently alienated humanist in the house of 
economic law technicians, maybe my own example will shed some light on 
the problem.  At the same time, as I have become more involved in children’s 
rights themes, I am equally impatient with the often sterile focus of human 
rights specialists on the UN reporting system.4  It seems to me that human 
rights specialists do not know how to advocate for law reform at global trade 
level, because they leave the entire operation to trade law specialists, perhaps 
on the assumption that it all looks so hard, they must know what they are 
doing, even if what they are doing is quite ill conceived.5 
In one sense, I stumbled into the teaching of trade law, was chosen by 
it rather than embracing it as a matter of inclination, but this was 
coincidentally at the very point when the WTO was being created.  I 
remember my Dean at University College Dublin asking whether I couldn’t 
just “read the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade GATT with them?”  
And that I certainly went on to do.  You will recall that in 1995, the WTO 
came into being and the talk of the town was that the old GATT system was 
being replaced by something more legalistic, the so-called judicialization and 
legalization of international trade regulation. 6  There was a distinct lawyerly 
thrill of pleasure. 
                                                 
4 Unlike the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, the UN’s human rights treaty 
bodies have no effective enforcement mechanisms, but rely on a reporting system 
where States report on their application and compliance with treaty requirements and 
a Committee responds to the reports.   
5 Though tangentially criticizing the WTO, human rights specialist groups such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, who address many trade related 
issues such as human trafficking, bonded labor, child labor, etc., have not established 
coherent and sustained strategies to advocate that the WTO address trade-related 
human rights problems.  Bryan Schwartz speculates as to why this might be. He 
writes:  
“The style of WTO opinions tends to be dry, lawyerly and technical. Those 
who write the decisions are no doubt anxious to demonstrate to governments 
and the wider public that their decisions are not based on subjective political 
values. Rather, the adjudicators involved are anxious to demonstrate that any 
conclusions they reach flow inexorably from the application of logic to the 
precise words of the trade provision at issue.”   
Bryan Schwartz, Lawyers and the Energing World Constitution, 1 Asper Rev. Int'l 
Bus. & Trade L. 1, 7 (2001).  He calls this tendency "seeking legitimacy through 
technicality." Id. 
6 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, arts. XI, XII, 
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) 
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The old GATT system, dating from the immediate postwar period, 
was based on non-discrimination and anti-protectionist principles.7  Disputes 
were resolved under an essentially diplomatic regime; the conclusions of the 
panel hearing the dispute could be blocked by the losing nation, thus evading 
the full legal implications of such a ruling. 8  Panels were ad hoc bodies of 
trade specialists, put together for the purpose of hearing a particular dispute.  
It seems safe to say that the public imagination was not frequently gripped by 
the doings at “the GATT,” except perhaps at moments like the handing down 
of the Tuna Dolphin panel report.9 
But in 1995, there was legal excitement for a number of reasons.  An 
enforceable dispute resolution mechanism in the form of a Dispute Settlement 
Understanding was created; in addition to the ad hoc panels, there would also 
be an appellate layer of review in the form of the Appellate Body, permanent 
and to that extent “court-like.”10  In addition to the development of 
enforcement mechanisms, there were also many new areas of substantive 
trade law brought into the mix, to which all WTO member countries would 
                                                                                                                    
[hereinafter WTO Agreement] (requiring all ratifying Members to accept agreements 
settled at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations). Between 1986 and 1994, the 
negotiators at the Uruguay Round created an intergovernmental organization (the 
WTO) that would enshrine the principles of the previous General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) relating to the trade in goods while adding agreements 
on trade in services, trade-related intellectual property, dispute settlement, and other 
supplemental agreements. See generally Raj Bhala & Kevin Kennedy, World Trade 
Law 8-15 (2d ed.) (2000) (explaining WTO's creation and mandate).  
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
8 Patrick M. Moore, Current Development: The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 
and the WTO Agreement, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 317, 319 (1996).  
9 United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada 
(Tuna/Dolphin I), Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.), para. 4.8 (1982) ; 
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin II), Aug. 16, 1991, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) para. 5.26 (1993), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594 (1991). 
10 Dispute Settlement Understanding, WTO Agreement, supra  note 6, arts. 4-6, 
Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining procedures for WTO Members attempting to 
resolve complaints).  DSU Article 4 encourages Members to first attempt to come to a 
mutual settlement of their dispute through good faith consultations. Id. art. 4. DSU 
Article 5 allows Members to voluntarily submit their dispute to conciliation and 
mediation by the WTO. Id. art. 5. DSU Article 6 permits the complaining Member to 
request the establishment of a WTO Panel, composed of individuals from a list of 
experienced practitioners, to settle the dispute. Id. art. 6. DSU Article 17 establishes a 
permanent WTO Appellate Body to hear appeals from Panel decisions. Id. art. 17. 
2005] SARA DILLON           107 
 
 
  
have to adhere, notably Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Services Agreement.  The Safeguards, 
Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements placed greater discipline on the use 
of self-protective measures by national governments.11  Seen as a package, the 
Uruguay Round results brought global trade regulation, that dull-sounding 
creature, into the informed public ’s consciousness. 
At least part of the reason for this flurry of attention was that this 
was…well, law.  It could be studied as other types of “real law” were studied.  
It was not aspirational or platitudinous in the manner of UN-centric human 
rights “law,” it was not simply soft law.12  Participating countries (more or 
less everyone, with several notable exceptions) had agreed, really agreed, to 
either offer compensation or accept the legitimacy of trade sanctions against 
them in the event of losing a dispute—the sanctions of course being imposed 
by the prevailing party.13  While the Appellate Body was not strictly bound to 
adhere to its own pronouncements, decisions of the new and permanent 
Appellate Body felt important.  They had global persuasive value; the whole 
system seemed to take on a concreteness and predictability unusual in 
international law.  One’s students might still whine, “But what happens if a 
country doesn’t go along with it?” but legal system it nevertheless appeared 
now to be.14  This question may still be raised, but so far, genuine crises have 
been avoided—crises such as this: Country X will not accept this ruling and 
rejects the WTO as a forum for adjudication. 
                                                 
11 WTO Agreement, supra  note 6, annex 1A. 
12 The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) creates a legalistic dispute 
settlement system, leading to rulings by an ad hoc panel and an Appellate Body, 
which, after adoption by the DSB,  have binding effects on the disputing Member 
States and may lead to significant costs if disregarded by a loser.  This could take the 
form of retaliatory tariffs placed on products of the “losing” country by the prevailing 
party. WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding, supra  note 6, annex 2 [hereinafter 
DSU].   
13 DSU, supra  note 12, arts. 21 & 22. 
14 There have been examples of a Member State not complying with Appellate Body 
reports, particularly the European Union’s non-compliance in the Bananas and Beef 
Hormones cases.  See Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the 
World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to 
Achieve Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade 133 (2001) 
[hereinafter Brimeyer]. 
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For different reasons, even now I also find the concept of true 
international legality suggestive to the point of thrilling, but only to the extent 
that the principle can at some point in the future be applied to other areas of 
human concern than trade law.  At its inception, there was very little 
articulated about the political goals of the new WTO. Ten years on, the 
question of overarching objectives has, if anything, become even more muted 
over time.15 The post-World War II GATT system, like the European 
Community (EC), was created to ensure international peace and stability, on 
the theory that economic integration facilitates peaceful co-existence.16  It was 
unclear what role “war and peace issues” played in the Uruguay Round, 
where the emphasis was rather on billions and trillions in wealth being created 
in the near term, with that great cheerleader for all that is good, Peter 
Sutherland, finding himself very much the right man at the right time.17 
Because the EU does not merely rely on a shared sense of wealth 
creation, efficiency and improved economic growth, the EU is 
correspondingly more complex and complete.  We are witnessing a moment 
of historical intensification in that regard, in that the new European 
Constitution will go far beyond ideas of a common market to fully embrace an 
EU mandate for human rights, and global security, in which the EU will 
participate on a newly coherent and unified basis—or so the myth of the 
“constitutional treaty” goes.18  If nothing else, the EU will have the capacity 
                                                 
15 The Doha Development Agenda was established to set objectives for multilateral 
agreements that would accelerate economic development for developing countries, 
particularly with regard to agricultural policies but also including, investment, 
environment, and competition policy.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).  At 
the subsequent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, however, these negotiations collapsed 
when over twenty developing countries walked out in protest to the unwillingness of 
the US and EU to give adequate concessions regarding agriculture.  See Clete D. 
Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presidential "Trade 
Promotion Authority" and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture Negotiations in the 
Doha Round, 32 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 437 (2004). 
16 See John H. Jackson, The Boundaries of the WTO: Afterword: The Linkage 
Problem--Comments on Five Texts, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 118, 121-22 (2002). 
17 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free 
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political 
Economy , 69 UMKC L. Rev. 733, 757 (2001) 
18 See the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and accompanying 
materials, at http://european-convention.eu.int. 
2005] SARA DILLON           109 
 
 
  
to become more nearly than ever before the federal superstate of Europhile 
vision and Euroskeptic nightmare.19 
But the WTO presented itself as a different sort of animal, as I will 
describe.  I have suggested elsewhere that if the WTO could be seen as part of 
a larger project of global governance, then so far we had only a Department of 
Commerce.20  While both systems, the WTO and the EU, have created a 
made-for measure language of rationality, at least the EU’s special lingo made 
one feel that there was some sort of courtly significance involved.  To read the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice is to participate in a complex 
exercise.  To master the language of the WTO exacts a different price from 
the pupil. A more frightening prospect is that the hyper-textualism and 
thousand- part tests of WTO law exactly suited the newly-minted trade law 
specialists, for whom the decontextualized aspect of WTO law was actually 
an academic plus. 
It has always been my wish that people who hate reading economic 
law, including what I consider to be extraordinarily turgid panel and 
Appellate Body reports, would embrace these documents with zest.  To the 
extent that trade law attracts a certain variety of specialist, due to its alien tone 
and its inhuman or anti-human characteristics (because so strictly 
decontextualized), and to the extent that it attracts people who actually enjoy 
the intellectual milieu created by the new subject matter, we are faced with a 
global governance challenge, one which I will explore below. 
What was the big deal about 1995? 
The so-called “Uruguay Round negotiations” spanned the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, roughly corresponding to the Single Market program in 
                                                 
19 See Grainne de Burca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: 
Europe's Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 
555 (2004); see also  Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed European Union 
Constitution -- Will it Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
173 (2004). 
20 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 22-23 (Norton, 2002).  
Stiglitz writes, “we have a system that might be called global governance without 
global government, one in which a few institutions - the World Bank, the IMF, the 
WTO - and a few players - the finance, commerce and trade ministries, closely linked 
to certain financial and commercial interests - dominate the scene, but in which many 
of those affected by their decisions are left almost voiceless.” Also cite to my Linkage 
article, where I coincidentally expressed a similar thought 
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Europe.21  These negotiations resulted in a set of new trade laws that were 
adopted according to an all-or-nothing principle thus: if participating 
countries wished to join, they would have to accept everything, the “whole 
package,” from soup to nuts, including those agreements that might go against 
their particular economic or developmental interests.22 
In that sense, I see many of the early WTO cases in studies of “tough 
luck,” perhaps analogous to early European Community cases where the 
European Court of Justice informed resistant Member States that they have 
just agreed to an unending, unyielding supranational system, into which they 
have poured significant amounts of their sovereignty and constitutional 
traditions.23  Resistance is futile, what you had hoped meant is irrelevant, 
and—characteristic of WTO law—only the text ultimately counts. (Nothing 
could be further from the truth, of course, in EU law.) 
                                                 
21 See generally Sara Dillon, International Trade Law and Economic Law and the 
European Union (Hart, 2002) [hereinafter Dillon]. 
22 Starting with the Uruguay Round accords, countries have had to participate in all of 
the negotiated agreements as part of a "single undertaking."  This requirement meant 
that developing countries had to commit to substantially greater reforms of their trade 
barriers and trade practices than they did in the past.  In the Uruguay Round, many 
countries had to accept obligations developed without their substantial participation, 
and which required the implementation and enforcement of regulatory policies that 
they have had great difficulty in fulfilling.  See Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, 
Decision Making in the WTO, in The WTO After Seattle 283, 284-285 (Jeffrey J. 
Schott ed., 2000).   
23 See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L’Energia Elecrica (ENEL), ECR 
585 (1964) (“By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and … more particularly, real 
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the 
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both 
their nationals and themselves”); Case 106/77, Amministazione Delle Finanze Dello 
Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal II), ECR 629 (1978) (“every national court 
must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect 
rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any 
provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to 
the Community rule”); Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Fransport, 
ex parte Factortame LTD (Factortame I), ECR I-2433 (1990) (“The full effectiveness 
of Community law would be … much impaired if a rule of national law could prevent 
a court seized of a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim 
relief”); Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-ost, ECR 4199 
(1987) (holding the European Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction to declare 
Community acts invalid). 
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One of my personal favorites of the early WTO cases is the “Indian 
Pharmaceuticals” case, where India is pounced upon by the United States and 
the EC to make sure that it scrupulously adheres to the terms of the transition 
to patent protection for pharmaceutical products.24  What interested me so 
much at the time the panel and Appellate Body reports came down was that 
on issues relating to whether India could  live up to the TRIPS Agreement the 
reports were silent.  On social issues, issues of poverty and impossibility and 
national self interest, including conflicting economic imperatives, the reports 
had essentially not a word to say.  The rulings were based on – or  grew out of 
– the text of the TRIPS Agreement.25 Context was absent or deemed 
irrelevant. How eager we are, by contrast, to invoke context and difficulties 
and process when we are speaking of full and immediate implementation of 
human rights imperatives! 
One could argue, of course, that with the death of GATT a la carte, 
there really was nothing outside “the text” to discuss. India had signed up to 
the terms of the TRIPS Agreement, so whatever other political concerns it 
had, or difficulties, or internal resistance, were no longer relevant, even 
though this was a “State to State” law and an international law system.  The 
panels and the Appellate Body are specialized bodies; they do not deal 
seriously with conflicting national laws outside the subject matter of the 
“national measure” being challenged, and only to a limited degree other 
sectors of international law.26  They do at times give the nod to other (non-
trade) treaties, but the Appellate Body has never struck me as analogous to 
real courts of law, where it is standard practice to balance and synthesize 
various and potentially conflicting principles of law.  International trade law, 
WTO law, is a technocratic branch of law, but with implications that go far 
beyond the technocratic.  This disconnect is in many ways tragic. 
                                                 
24 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) 
25 WTO Agreement, supra  note 5, annex 1C. 
26 See Jeffery Atik, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Democratizing the 
WTO, 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 451, 452 (2001).  Atik states: “Although the WTO 
is still of recent origin it yields considerable (and unexpected) power. The substantive 
terms of its agreements limit the scope of action for national regulation, stripping 
power away from states. Its enhanced dispute resolution mimics a form of 
hierarchical supremacy: WTO rules act as a super-constitutional text with a force 
superior to ordinary national enactments. Once the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
finds that a national measure is inconsistent with a WTO obligation, the WTO 
member is expected to bring its law into conformity.” Id. 
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There were other early cases that struck me as profoundly important 
and interesting, when seen through the prism of trade values opposed to 
“other” values.  Two of the most instructive battles taking place between the 
US and the EC were the Beef Hormones case and the Bananas case.27  
Although the EC is happy to use WTO law as a blunt instrument when 
necessary, in these cases the EC’s regulatory values were at stake, and the 
powerful EC, simply put, lost.28  
The Uruguay Round’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
Agreement, upon which the Beef Hormones case was argued, was a startling 
document, in that it placed an explicit burden on countries to justify their food 
safety rules, and mystified the idea of “scientific evidence.”  Consumer 
protection rules that involve additives and pests are difficult enough to 
achieve at national level, and despite the kindler, gentler rhetoric of the 
Appellate Body to the effect that countries were indeed “free to choose” their 
“appropriate” level of protection, as far as I could ever read the agreement and 
the decisions taken under it, the bottom line was that without some scientific 
basis for a restrictive national regulation, the WTO would have the power to 
invalidate it.29 
Many might ask, well, what is wrong with that?  National regulations 
purportedly based on harm to human or animal health must be justified in 
scientific terms, or be struck down in the name of free trade.  Trade law rules 
out only hypochondria, hypersensitivity, and perhaps in the process blots out 
historical memory of other times when the populace was told: “it is safe, all 
the scientists say so.”  The EC attempted to urge a “limits to science” 
approach in its Beef Hormones defense.30  The United States has acted on the 
same sort of impulse—prove that it is justified or give it up—in its more 
                                                 
27 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (Jan. 16, 1998) 
[hereinafter Beef Hormones]; WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European 
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).  See also, Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, 
The WTO Beef Hormone Dispute: An Analysis of the Appellate Body Decision, 5 U.C. 
Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 219 (1999); Hunter R. Clark, The WTO Banana Dispute 
Settlement and Its Implications for Trade Relations between the United States and the 
European Union , 35 Cornell Int'l L.J. 291 (2002). 
28 See Brimeyer, supra  note 14; 147-162. 
29 WTO Agreement, supra  note 5, at annex 1A – Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures . 
30 Beef Hormones, supra  note 28, paras. 177-180. 
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recent challenge to the EU’s reluctance to allow the commercial use of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).31  Miffed that the EC has not 
allowed the release of GMOs under laws that actually do make such 
controlled releases possible, the US has again dared the EU to present a 
scientific defense where perhaps none truly exists.  The point to me is that 
public pressure of the “No thank you, just don’t want it” variety, whether or 
not it is strictly rational or totally scientific, gets demoted in the regulatory 
process. 
As mentioned above, these recent cases have their roots in the Tuna-
Dolphin dispute of the early 1990s, although the Tuna-Dolphin reports 
remained blocked by the US.32  The upshot of Tuna-Dolphin, however, was 
that the US could not refuse to import tuna on the basis that it disapproved of 
the manner in which the tuna was caught, based on its environmental or 
regulatory values.  So interesting was this stark dilemma to the academic 
mind that certain academic careers seemed to be formed in the cauldron of 
Tuna-Dolphin analysis.  But after 1995, with the binding nature of the dispute 
resolution system, the stakes were much higher.  It was no longer open to 
countries to shrug off the decisions of the WTO panels, let alone those of the 
new Appellate Body. 
The reaction to this new legal reality appeared to lead in several 
different directions in the late 1990s and beyond.  First of all, from around 
1998 through September 11 (after which I believe it faltered), there was the 
anti-globalization movement.  While some of the criticism leveled at the 
WTO was incoherent, the WTO did clearly become a symbol of globalization, 
and thus a focus of dissent.33  It seems obvious that this occurred because 
                                                 
31 See Permanent Mission of the United States, First Submission of the United States 
in European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292 & 293 (Apr. 21, 2004).  See also David 
Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, Brian Wynne, 
Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 
30 Yale J. Int'l L. 81 (2005). 
32 See GATT, Report of the Dispute Panel , United States-Prohibition of Imports of 
Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) (Feb. 22, 1982) 
(unadopted); GATT, Report of the Dispute Panel, United States – Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM 
1594 (1991) (unadopted). 
33 See generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations 
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829 (1995) 
(describing the creation of the WTO and the new "legalism" in international trade 
114 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION  [Vol. 33:1 
 
 
 
WTO was now seen as law, even if far more significant decisions were being 
taken by international economic bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.  
The WTO gained attention because of its binding nature.  Disputes, cases, 
laws and rules make for visibility – and public presence.  The WTO was an 
instance of the transnational economic forces of big business and the stronger 
countries getting their way over national resistance.  So, even if it could be 
argued that what the WTO was achieving was relatively modest in global 
terms, it makes sense that the protesters had the WTO squarely in their sites. 
For me, it was the potential of the WTO – the idea – of the WTO that 
was striking.  Its power over national regulation was, at least at global level, 
unparalleled.  In writing my own book, it seems to me that one of my own 
objectives was to make the specific nature of the individual disputes—the 
clash between national laws and trade principles—intelligible to a wider 
audience so that more of the critics could get an idea of what they were 
actually criticizing. 34  It was and still is my belief that this global trade law 
should be seen as contestable.  
A second strand of “trade law studies” was represented by the 
“earnest analysts,” those who wrote piles of law review articles on all the 
“trade and” subjects – trade and the environment, trade and labor – asking 
such questions as whether the WTO could in the end be a force for good in 
these areas.35  Beyond this kind of analysis lurked a more fundamental 
question: what was the basis for this newly binding global law, when binding 
international law is otherwise so hard to come by?  Was there more to this 
than just the legal arm of transnational business? In the parlance of a few 
years ago, what was the legitimacy of the WTO?36  
                                                                                                                    
law); David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millenium Round" in Seattle: 
Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 349, 350-
57 (2000) (outlining some of the reasons for the first major protests  against the WTO 
in Seattle in 1999). 
34 See Dillon, supra note 21, at preface. 
35 See, e.g.,  Steve Charnovitz,  Trade Law and Global Governance (Cameron May, 
2002);  Steve Charnovitz, The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World 
Trade Organization, 96 Am. J. Int’l L.28 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair 
Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 459 (1994). Robert 
Schaeffer, Trading Away the Planet, 15 Greenpeace, Sept.-Oct. 1990. 
36 See Robert Howse, The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technocracy--
and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime , 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 94 
(2002); Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in The 
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At some point, the criticism of the WTO as a symbol of globalization 
led to corresponding expectations that the WTO could somehow, through the 
power of trade law, present a legal response to child labor and human rights 
abuses.37  I always had the impulse to point out that the WTO had no such 
role, no such explicit mandate, no such subject matter jurisdiction.  But real 
lawyers like “law,” and for a period of several years, the WTO remained an 
irresistible focus on all sides. 
My impression is that this set of legitimacy questions was never really 
sorted out to any satisfactory degree.  Rather, the very earnest participants got 
bored by their own debate.  If the WTO were to be altered in any significant 
way, all that could happen would be a turning back to a pre-1995-like 
situation, where diplomacy predominated over law.  Should the US Congress, 
driven by constituency conflic ts over these issues, ever really say “enough,” 
that too much sovereignty and protectionist discretion had been sacrificed to 
the needs of transnational business, then such a turning back would be the 
likely result.38  A more progressive, complex, global governance — oriented 
WTO plus was hardly on the cards.  But the WTO simply moved forward, as it 
was, from one issue and minor frisson to another, with the US Congress trying 
to ensure that an evolving WTO served the multiple interests and needs of the 
                                                                                                                    
Legitimacy of International Organizations 355 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo 
Heiskanen eds., 2001), Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty 
Interpretation in International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in 
The EU , The WTO, and NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade 59 
(J.H.H. Weiler ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000); Joseph Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers 
and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of 
Dispute Settlement, in  Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading 
System at the Millennium 334 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian, 
& Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001). 
37 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far 
Can We Go? 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001). But see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of 
WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 333, 342 (1999) (arguing that WTO 
dispute resolution is authorized to directly apply only WTO law). 
38 U.S. Congressional distaste for the WTO dispute resolution process was expressed 
by Senator Max Baucus, stating that WTO panels are "making up rules that the US 
never negotiated, that Congress  never approved, and I suspect, that Congress would 
never approve." US DSU Proposal Receives Mixed Reactions, Bridges Wkly. Trade 
News Dig., Dec. 20, 2002, at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-12-20/wtoinbrief.htm. 
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US, even if this incidentally and correspondingly greatly disadvantaged one’s 
trading partners.39 
I personally got stuck at this chronological place in the debate. I 
wanted to know, I still want to know, what the overall effect on human 
welfare was of eliminating ever more national regulations with the potential 
of restricting trade. I wanted to know why the WTO should have a binding 
dispute resolution mechanism when human rights law and other branches of 
international law do not—why is human rights law of all things notoriously 
“fluffy,” unlawyerlike, aspirational?  I realize that the question sounds naïve, 
but that impression of naïveté is a function of lawyers’ preference for 
minutiae, rather than any problem with the question itself. 
I think the community of trade law scholars simply got tired of this 
debate and moved on to a more accepting kind of insiders’ analysis.  It 
became far trendier to treat the Appellate Body as an established court and to 
examine all disputes, whatever their subject matter, as a treasure trove of legal 
principles and jurisprudential tests.40  The Appellate Body turned out to be a 
reliable and respectable target of lawyerly attention. 
We recently marked the tenth anniversary of the NAFTA Agreement.  
NAFTA of course has triggered a varie ty of changes in the North American 
trade relationship: tariffs lowered or removed, other trade related restrictions 
                                                 
39 A report transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress concluded that the 
disputes referred to the DSB generally "have been handled expeditiously and with 
professionalism" and that "WTO dispute settlement has benefited a wide range of 
U.S. industries and their workers," but adds that "the United States does not agree 
with the approach that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have sometimes taken in 
disputes," and criticizes several specific instances of judicial lawmaking in trade 
remedy cases.  The report suggested some measured fine-tuning to offer "greater 
member control over the dispute settlement process," and noted that though judicial 
lawmaking at the WTO has become a political irritant in the US, Appellate Body 
lawmaking has only marginally weakened U.S. trade remedy laws, but is operating 
near its political limits. Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute 
Settle ment Panels and the Appellate Body, Report to the Congress Transmitted by the 
Secretary of Commerce 8-10 (Dec. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf. 
40 See generally Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, editors, Patrick Blatter, 
associate editor, Does the WTO Judge Trespass His Mandate?, The Role of Judge in 
International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for the WTO, (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003). 
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eliminated, greater rights for investors.  Yet, despite all this, a recent Carnegie 
Endowment report indicated that the overall economic effect on the average 
Mexican was a wash.41  NAFTA had not brought significantly higher levels of 
employment, had not led to general prosperity, had not raised the boats of the 
poor.  Indeed, in the agricultural sector, the effect was dazzlingly negative.42  
This lack of a measurable benefit for most people went mostly unremarked.  
Perhaps the study of law in general does not encourage linking technique to 
larger purposes.  Maybe it is not the job of a lawyer to wonder what a 
particular set of laws is designed to achieve.  It does seem an amazing 
abdication of responsibility, however, to ignore these implications altogether. 
As with all branches of law, it is the tendency of trade lawyers to 
think in terms of particular disputes.  Lawyers love, or at least gravitate 
towards, judicial standards applied to dispute resolution.  As if of mystical 
interest for its own sake, the test that decides the day in court is an object of 
devotion for lawyers.  
Although many might disagree with me on this, reading panel and 
Appellate Body decisions is at best an acquired taste.  The more sensitive 
among us will flock to a field of study with some more recognizable link to 
the realm of human concern.  As a consequence, the specialist discourse 
around trade law becomes increasingly limited to those able to follow the 
hair-splitting discussions characteristic of the rulings. This is even more the 
case as the “legitimacy” discussion dies away, and the WTO is increasingly 
accepted for “being what it is”. 
I imagine high school students still read Kafka’s The Trial.43  Perhaps 
it should be required reading in law schools, as it is of far more intellectual 
relevance than One L.44  Looking back on what we were meant to read The 
Trial for, beyond the anti-totalitarian slant to American secondary education, 
surely it was meant to indicate that we must be on guard against the 
perversions of a legal system that is all detail and no significance; all process 
and no explanation.  This is a fairly portable lesson, and one that should 
caution us in accepting the deadpan detail of trade law disputes. 
                                                 
41 Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages and Household Income , in NAFTA's Promise and 
Reality 24 (CEIP, 2003) available at 
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/NAFTA_Report_ChapterOne.pdf. 
42 Id. at 10-13. 
43 Franz Kafka, The Trial (N.Y.: Schocken, 1925). 
44 Scott Turow, One L  (N.Y.: Putnam, 1977). 
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It is often said that EU law, with its complex legislative process, 
elaborate separation of powers principles, and dense body of regulation, is 
technocratic and off-putting. 45  I actually find EU law to be immensely poetic, 
especially the decisions of the Court of Justice.46  This is particularly true in 
comparison with international trade law. The ECJ hovers between context and 
text, compressing historical meaning into the ultimate legal bon mot. 
As for international trade law, it is rewarding if and when we 
maintain an interest in the very issues that, as I have explained, seem to have 
died away in the last few years.  Identifying the judicial qualities of the 
Appellate Body, and pondering whether it is “activist” as a court, seem to be 
questions that put the cart very much before the horse.47  Perhaps taking such 
questions as our focus makes WTO law appear to be pleasingly self evident, 
makes trade law appear to be a regular law subject, even though we have not 
yet begun to sort out such foundational matters as whether trade law should 
endure in its present form at all. 
Last year’s collapse of the Doha Round talks at Cancun were of 
interest, in that an organized bloc of developing countries refused to repeat the 
experience of the Uruguay Round, where the wealthiest countries were 
essentially able to dictate the terms.48  At Cancun, it became clear that 
agricultural reform, including the elimination of heavily distorting agricultural 
subsidies by the US and EC, would be a precondition for any real progress. 
This flurry of activity forced a revisit to buried issues of fairness and 
distribution of gains, but so briefly and in such a limited way, that it would be 
unjustified on this basis alone to make predictions about a new departure for 
global trade law. 
I can offer my own prescriptions for the future study of international 
trade law, knowing full well that these recommendations will likely not be 
heeded. As tempting as such an approach appears to be, I do not think that 
studying WTO law, or WTO law with a twist of NAFTA, makes sense in 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., David A.O. Edward, What Kind of Law Does Europe Need? The Role of 
Law, Lawyers and Judges in Contemporary European Integraton, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
1, 7-8 (1999). 
46 See supra  note 23. 
47 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: 
Developing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 353 (2002). 
48 See Melaku Geboye Desta, The Bumpy Ride Towards the Establishment of "a Fair 
and Market Oriented Agricultural Trading System" at the WTO: Reflections 
Following the Cancun Setback , 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489 (2003). 
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isolation from other international institutions.  We should know much more 
than we do about the development potential of trade rules and principles, or 
indeed the lack of such potential.  Mystifying the disputes and the attendant 
“jurisprudence” cannot bring us any closer to such insights.  I would suggest 
adopting an international economic law approach that covers the decision-
making methodology of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank so 
that the big three of international economic institutions can be seen as 
working in tandem, and their collective goals can be better scrutinized.  It is 
the IMF and World Bank that could steer aid and investment in a manner 
calculated to achieve development results.49  A serious and hard-hitting 
human rights dimension would also be an essential feature of such a field of 
study. On that basis and foundation, “non-discrimination in trade” might 
actually have some significant wealth creation power. On its own, trade law 
seems to generate an endless series of empty legal gestures. 
I recognize that what I advocate is implicitly rejected by mainstream 
“trade studies” in favor of a focus on “the dispute,” since that fits so 
comfortably into the hegemony of the “case method” approach to legal 
studies.  Despite the prevalent “trade and” fatigue, human rights people 
should begin to invade the inner sanctum of international trade meetings and 
conferences, where, as in so many other fields, a repetitious band of “experts” 
and specialists preside.  Law schools and lawyers, as a product of these 
schools, distrust the big ideas, the context, the great notion that inspires and 
propels reform.  We need to know whether we are about “constructing global 
governance,” or merely “removing barriers to trade” in the name of greater 
global efficiency and that rather silly anachronism, comparative advantage.  If 
the former, then the study of international trade law has the potential to 
become a wonderful process, as students are encouraged to link trade rules to 
human—yes, human--development goals.  
                                                 
49 For history and analysis of past and present development models of the IMF and 
World Bank, see Jeremy J. Sanders, The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth 
in the Global Market , 9 Currents Int'l Trade L.J. 37 (2000). 
